

# MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY: THE NECESSITY OF A FACTICAL TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT

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*Abstract:* Heidegger's criticism of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and Husserl is primarily leveled at its underlying understanding of the transcendental subject. Heidegger argues that in order to give an adequate account of the intelligibility of the world, the transcendental subject must be factual. By discussing central aspects of Heidegger's criticism, this paper shows that his notion of a factual transcendental subject is a necessary step out of aporias of transcendental philosophy. I argue that Heidegger's emphasis on the facticity of the human being must be understood not as an abandonment of the transcendental stand-point, but as a radicalization of its central ideas. Heidegger is thereby transforming transcendental philosophy into a transcendental ontology. I demonstrate that this allows Heidegger to reconceptualize the constitution of the world as social and historical without having to jettison the role of the transcendental subject.

*Keywords:* Martin Heidegger, Phenomenology, Transcendental Philosophy, Kant, Husserl

## 1. Introduction

Martin Heidegger's criticism of transcendental philosophy is primarily leveled at its underlying understanding of the transcendental subject. Heidegger argues that the transcendental subject must be a factual living being—rendering the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental subject redundant.<sup>1</sup> He shows that only by anchoring transcendentalism in the human being's facticity—that is its lived experience—can one make sense of the dynamic processes through which the world and the world's manifold beings are constituted.<sup>2</sup>

Heidegger's concept of a *factual transcendental subject* has been conceived of as an illegitimate anthropomorphizing of transcendental philosophy, claiming that Heidegger is abandoning the scientific, rigorous nature of the transcendental inquiry, ultimately ending up in irrational mysticism or poetry.<sup>3</sup> In this paper, I examine Heidegger's extension of the central ideas

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and Husserl. I aim to demonstrate that the Heideggerian “concretization of transcendental subjectivity”<sup>4</sup> is in fact a necessary step out of aporias of transcendental philosophy. Instead of leading philosophy into irrationalism, Heidegger finds a way to radicalize the basic ideas of transcendental philosophy while simultaneously extending its scope to also encompass the richness of the historical and shared factual lifeworld. The purpose of this paper is to present a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s early philosophy that shows that his emphasis on the facticity of the human being is not only in line with transcendental philosophy but rather a necessary further development.

I begin by clarifying the meaning of Heidegger’s use of the concept “transcendence” in the context of Heidegger’s primary work *Being and Time*<sup>5</sup> (section 2). This leads to the discussion of Heidegger’s criticism of the transcendental philosophy of Kant (section 3) and Husserl (section 4). This criticism is summarized under the heading the “Over-empowering of the Transcendental Subject” (section 5). I then go on to explain Heidegger’s solution to the problems he identifies in Kant and Husserl’s accounts: the fusion between ontology and transcendental philosophy (section 6). To show the continuity of Heidegger’s transcendental philosophy, I suggest a novel interpretation of the “turning” of Heidegger’s philosophy (section 7). This article ends with a conclusion in which I highlight the implications of Heidegger’s radicalization of transcendental philosophy (section 8).

### 2. The “Problem of Transcendence” in *Being and Time*

In *Being and Time*, the term “transcendence” is used in two different senses. In the first sense, it refers to the then often discussed epistemological “problem of the transcendence”<sup>6</sup> of the external world.<sup>7</sup> In the second sense, it refers to the “transcendence of Dasein”<sup>8</sup> which stands for Heidegger’s take on this problem.<sup>9</sup>

For Heidegger, the former is linked to questions about “how the subject can get out of its immanence,” and about the “reality” of the external world. In Heidegger’s view, these questions are at best misleading, pseudo-problems, and philosophical nonstarters:

The “problem of transcendence” cannot be reduced to the question of how does a subject get outside to an object, whereby the totality of objects is identified with the idea of the world. We must rather ask what makes it ontologically possible for beings to be encountered within the world and objectified as encountered beings?<sup>10</sup>

The “transcendence of Dasein,” which is the second sense in which Heidegger speaks of “transcendence” in *Being and Time*, provides the way out of this problem by naming the ontological condition that makes the encountering of objects possible. Thus, for Heidegger, the epistemological “problem of

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

transcendence” can only be resolved through the ontological analysis of Dasein’s factual Being.<sup>11</sup> Epistemology is replaced by Heidegger’s “ontology of facticity.”<sup>12</sup>

The idea of a “transcending subject” has a long history (Heidegger even refers it to Heraclitus),<sup>13</sup> but Heidegger’s main reference for his use of the concept was Immanuel Kant and his *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>14</sup> I will unpack this to show how Heidegger builds on transcendental philosophy and simultaneously extends its central ideas.

### 3. *The Problem of Transcendence in Kant’s Philosophy*

The famous point of departure of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is that knowledge of objects is only possible if the two faculties of understanding and sensibility form a unified whole: The predetermination of objects happens in understanding, but because this understanding is finite (and not divine), it is dependent on what is given to it through sensibility.<sup>15</sup> Kant explains how this unity comes about in the transcendental deduction of the first *Critique*.

Despite Heidegger’s repeated praise of the great importance of Kant’s philosophy,<sup>16</sup> he nevertheless sees a problem at the heart of Kant’s first *Critique* which he calls the problem of the “essential unity of knowledge.”<sup>17</sup> What Heidegger is missing in Kant’s explanation is a fully developed account of the possibility of the “unity” between the subject’s understanding and the objects that are given in sensibility. Without such an account, Heidegger says, the question about the possibility of knowledge remains unanswered because it would be impossible for the subject to “get in touch” with objects.<sup>18</sup> In the following, I will first clarify why this is problematic in Heidegger’s view and then turn to his solutions.

The union between sensibility and understanding is attested in the transcendental deduction: Kant answered questions about how a subject gets outside to an object and how knowledge of the outside world can be validated, by showing that the a priori conditions of experience make the experience of objects possible.<sup>19</sup> There is, in other words, no unbridgeable gap between the subject and its objects. Knowledge of objects is possible because the principles of the “possibility of experiences” are necessarily the principles of the “objects of experience.” Heidegger, however, responds that in order that these principles can be principles *of objects*, they must stand in an a priori relation to these objects. And only *by virtue of being in that relation*, they can function as determinants of the objectivity of the objects.<sup>20</sup> Heidegger argues that the transcendental subject must already be in an a priori relation to these objects to constitute them in their objectivity.

The main question for Heidegger is, how does this a priori relation come about?<sup>21</sup> Is it something the subject can come up with on its own account or is it rather something that the subject presupposes? Furthermore, is this

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

precondition an epistemic or an ontological condition?<sup>22</sup> How these questions are answered, will set the course for transcendental philosophy.

Heidegger will opt for the latter. According to him, the a priori relation to beings of all kinds is the presupposition for the subject's relation to objects and therefore "prior" to the principle of apperception.<sup>23</sup> This decision—to focus on the nature of what must, in a unique way, precede transcendental subjectivity—will alter his understanding of the transcendental: Neither the transcendental nor the "a priori conditions" of knowledge are attributed to the subject. Rather, they are now conceived of as something that is the foundation and yet exceeds the subjectivity of the subject. Heidegger will call this the openness, the clearing, the between, or the event.<sup>24</sup> Chad Engelland describes this move as going back to the ancient Greek "sense of things": Only in this openness can beings show themselves, and only by being receptive to this self-showing of beings can human beings sense anything at all.<sup>25</sup> To uncover the reasons for this decision, we must return to Heidegger's critique of Kant.

The difference between Heidegger and Kant is that in the B-Edition (according to Heidegger's interpretation), Kant seems to favor the idea that it is pure understanding which is responsible for establishing its a priori relation to objects (their necessary synthetic unity).<sup>26</sup> The "original synthetic unity of apperception"<sup>27</sup> becomes responsible not only for establishing the objectivity of its objects but also for encountering such objects.<sup>28</sup> It is this decision to rely on the faculty of "understanding" that Heidegger identifies with remaining stuck within the framework of the modern philosophy of subjectivity.<sup>29</sup> I will refer to this as the over-empowering of the transcendental subject.

It is worth noting that Heidegger sees a glimpse of his (phenomenological) understanding of transcendental philosophy in the A-Edition of Kant's first *Critique*. There, it is imagination (in its relation to time) that becomes the pointer to something that precedes the subject-object relation and thus grounds the union between sensibility and understanding.<sup>30</sup> Heidegger famously speaks of it as the "root," as in, the ground of the other faculties: pure imagination "has the character of a root, [ . . . ] it lets the stems grow out from itself."<sup>31</sup> Its function is to transform the categories into something that allows objects to present themselves and to transform what is given in sensibility into something that can be determined by understanding.<sup>32</sup> According to Heidegger, time functions as the underlying common ground that provides the necessary unity of subject and object and thus makes knowledge of objects possible.<sup>33</sup>

Heidegger's problem is not so much that understanding might overshadow and perhaps displace sensibility.<sup>34</sup> Rather, his problem with Kant's shift of emphasis towards understanding is that it (allegedly) comes with a shift towards the transcendental subject and its faculties since it is the subject that is now conceived of as the ground of its relation to objects. As Engelland puts it: "The fact that the union of thought and intuition happens on the basis

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

of understanding's principles points to a continued dominance of thought."<sup>35</sup> There is, on the one side, Kant who places his "trust" in the principles of understanding and the faculties of the subject which represent what Engelland calls the dominance of thought;<sup>36</sup> and there is, on the other side, Heidegger, who puts his money on imagination and "time" as an indication of something that grounds the transcendental subject.

To sum up the points we made about Heidegger's critique of Kant: the danger that Heidegger sees, especially in the B-Edition of Kant's first *Critique*, is the over-empowering of the transcendental subject, which is a neglect of what Heidegger calls the thrownness, the finitude, or the facticity of that subject. Before we unpack this argument and clarify why exactly this "over-empowering" and the continued "dominance of thought" is problematic, we will turn to Heidegger's critique of Husserl, because he sees a similar issue in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

### 4. *The Problem of Transcendence in Husserl's Philosophy*

Kant's insight about the transcendental subject is developed further by Husserl, who is in his thinking remarkably close to neo-Kantians like Natorp, Rickert, Lask, and Cassirer.<sup>37</sup> One basic principle of Husserl's phenomenology is that of the a priori correlation of the transcendental ego with its objects.<sup>38</sup> While Heidegger fully agrees with the basic idea of this correlation, he still sees a problem with the Cartesian heritage of orientating oneself towards consciousness.<sup>39</sup> Some of the main issues become visible in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*.<sup>40</sup> There, Husserl provides an intentional analysis of the syntheses carried out by the ego, which are simultaneously self-constitutions.<sup>41</sup> For Husserl, the ground of such self-constitution, the "continuous inner consciousness of time,"<sup>42</sup> is the possibility condition for encountering an object through one's perceptions. As Gethmann points out, because Husserl's "time-consciousness" is still a form of consciousness, this reference to time remains in the framework of the intentional analysis of conscious acts.<sup>43</sup> It remains, in other words, in the framework of the philosophy of subjectivity.

And this is why Heidegger raises a question similar to that in his Kant-lectures: Can the self-constitution of the transcendental ego, even if it is conceived of in terms of the inner consciousness of time, account for its very encounter with objects, and can this encounter be understood as a synthesizing achievement of *consciousness*?<sup>44</sup> Even if one takes this self-constitution to be a necessary condition for encountering objects, there is a problem if one takes it as a sufficient one, implying that the encounter is a product of intentional acts carried out by consciousness.<sup>45</sup> In that case, the subject is not only responsible for carrying out the intentional acts which are constitutive of the intelligibility of the objects. It also becomes responsible for the givenness of these objects. This is what I termed the over-empowering of the transcen-

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

dental subject above: according to Heidegger, Husserl avoids the question of how consciousness is capable of being the ground for its encounter with objects. Steven Crowell finds succinct words to summarize the problem: for Husserl “to ask how conscious acts can mean or intend anything is to ask one question too many. For Heidegger, however, this is precisely the question that must be asked.”<sup>46</sup> It is the question of the necessary unity between the constituting transcendental subject and the constituted objects.<sup>47</sup>

### *5. The Over-Empowering of the Transcendental Subject*

To clarify what exactly the problem is with the over-empowering of the transcendental subject, I will draw attention to two of its main problems that, as Heidegger claims, both Kant and Husserl are not able to address sufficiently. The first problem is that of the givenness of objects in their allegedly purely subjective idealism.<sup>48</sup> I explain this by returning to what Heidegger calls the epistemological “problem of transcendence,” which revolves around the question of how the subject does get “outside” to an object. What is at stake, is the philosophical justification of the fact that subjects are dealing with objects and not just with imaginations.

Heidegger argues that the transcendental subject cannot be the ground of its relation to objects because whatever it comes up with is of subjective origin and hence still something “subjective” which means that the referentiality to objects still needs to be attested.<sup>49</sup> The subject would remain stuck in the immanence of its subjectivity, and what is given to the subject is only what the subject has given to itself which renders speaking of the givenness of objects nonsensical. To account for the givenness of objects within the human experience, the a priori relation between the subject and the object must exceed and ultimately be different from the subjectivity of the subject.<sup>50</sup>

As Gethmann points out, Heidegger’s problem with Kant and with Husserl is that this givenness of objects—or more generally, the givenness of beings—cannot be adequately described as either the self-constitution of a transcendental subject or as an application of principles of understanding, without “overburdening the capability of the subject.”<sup>51</sup> In both cases, the givenness of beings becomes the product of the subject and the meaning of “givenness” is lost since it becomes something that the subject gives itself.<sup>52</sup>

What this tells us, is, that Heidegger suspects that neither Kant nor Husserl sufficiently solved the epistemological “problem of transcendence.”<sup>53</sup> He argues that both the emphasis on the transcendental apperception and pure understanding (Kant) and on the self-constitution of the transcendental ego (Husserl) come with the danger of subjective idealism in which it is impossible to account for the givenness of objects in experiences because there is an unbridgeable gap between subject and object.<sup>54</sup> The subject would only deal with itself—there is no world, no objects, no things; or at least, no chance for the subject to encounter them.

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

The second problem of identifying transcendental with the subjectivity of the subject has to do with the ontological status of the transcendental subject. If the transcendental subject is conceived of as the ground of constitution and if therefore the constitution of things is understood as a (purely) subjective constitution, it is not clear how one can account for differences between different modes of Being, for example between the Being of the constituting I and the Being of constituted things.<sup>55</sup> It is not clear how the transcendental subject can simultaneously constitute and be constituted. Is the reality of the transcendental subject that of “being-constituted”? Or mustn't the reality of the constituting I be ultimately different from the constituted objects because its reality is that of constituting? If the reality of things is conceived of as “being-constituted” and if therefore Being is used (univocally) as “being-constituted,” how can either Kant or Husserl address the question about the reality of the constituting I?<sup>56</sup> Heidegger concludes:

The question about the way of Being [*Seinsart*] of the constituting-being itself cannot be avoided. Therefore, the problem of Being has to be considered universally in its relation to the constituting-being and to constituted-beings.<sup>57</sup>

An unavoidable question, says Heidegger, if one proceeds from the assumption that the transcendental subject needs to be something in order to constitute the objectivity of objects. For him, the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical subject is only a pseudo-solution by which the constituting I is relocated to a non-existing ideal sphere, and yet, the constitution is somehow still supposed to be valid of objects in the real world.<sup>58</sup> The problem then becomes that of *methexis*: of how the ideal is “in touch” with the real.<sup>59</sup>

Despite the important question of whether Heidegger is right with this assessment, which one can certainly question,<sup>60</sup> it suffices to regard it as the backdrop against which Heidegger's “ontology of facticity” can be seen as an extension (and not as an abandonment) of transcendental philosophy. The “problem of transcendence” becomes the key to understanding how Heidegger adapts and radicalizes transcendental philosophy. In the following section, I will present Heidegger's solution for the aforementioned problems, which is at the same time the reason why transcendental philosophy becomes ontological.

### 6. Heidegger's Solution: Transcendental Ontology

One particularly well-suited starting point to explain Heidegger's fusion of transcendental philosophy and ontology is his exchange with Husserl about the article on “Phenomenology” for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. In a letter, Heidegger emphasizes the importance of Husserl's theory of constitution (in this context, “constituting” becomes a synonym for “transcending”). But at the same time, he points out the necessity to ask a question that leads beyond Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego—a question about the Being of the constituting, transcending subject.<sup>61</sup> Heidegger thereby turns Husserl's

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

question about transcendental subjectivity (consciousness) into an ontological question about the Being of the transcendental subject.<sup>62</sup> The reflection on the relation between the constituting transcendental subject and the constituted beings becomes the task of a foundational discipline called ontology.

What makes Heidegger's ontology a transcendental ontology, is that any reflection on what Being "is" is bound to the (reflection on the) transcendental of the subject.<sup>63</sup> Heidegger states, in *Being and Time*, that the ontological question about Being

requires a delineation of *the* phenomenon in which something like Being itself becomes accessible—the phenomenon of the *understanding of Being*.

But this phenomenon belongs to the ontological make-up of Dasein.<sup>64</sup>

Being is only accessible by making explicit what is implicit in Dasein's factual constitution.<sup>65</sup> Heidegger's key term for what I explain as "factual constitution" is "thrown project" (*geworfener Entwurf*), accentuating that Dasein is thrown into the facticity of its existence.<sup>66</sup> Heidegger's transcendental ontology is neither simply the reflection on the subjective conditions of the intelligibility of the world, nor is it an attempt to make assertions about things-in-themselves independent of how the subject is in a relation to them. Heidegger finds a third way: the reflection on how Being is constituted within Dasein's different ways of Being. It is a reflection on the transcendental of Dasein—something that is always already happening at the core of Dasein's factual existence.<sup>67</sup> In *Being and Time*, this is called the modification of Dasein's "preontological understanding" of Being into an "ontological" understanding.<sup>68</sup> This allows Heidegger to raise questions about the Being of different kinds of beings—for example about the difference between the Being of the constituting I and that of the constituted objects—without falling back into pre-Critical philosophy.<sup>69</sup>

If we assume that there was a shift from the traditional ontology to epistemology happening with Descartes and Kant, there is another shift happening with Heidegger, one from epistemology to transcendental ontology.<sup>70</sup> Heidegger overcomes the epistemological "problem of transcendence" in *Being and Time* by referring to Being (*Sein*) as a *third* element, beyond subject and object. The main point here is that Heidegger's transcendental ontology involves a *threefold* relation between the ground of constitution (Being), the being that facilitates constitution (Dasein), and what is constituted (the Being of beings).<sup>71</sup> Instead of what might be called the two-dimensional-model of transcendental philosophy which is bound to the subject-object dichotomy and the dichotomy of a constituting I and constituted objects, Heidegger develops a three-dimensional-model in which the transcendental of the subject is not identified with the faculties of the subject, but rather a feature of Dasein's Being. In Heidegger's transcendental ontology, Being becomes the ground of the transcendental of the subject. Being still functions as

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

the “synthesis a priori,” forming the essential and necessary unity between “subject” and “object,” making it possible that the subject can experience objects of any kind. This allows Heidegger to break through the paradigm of the subject-object dichotomy and conceptualize the ground of their necessary unity as something that “exceeds” the mere subjectivity of the subject.

The core principle of this transcendental ontology is explained in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger states: “The self [. . .] can *never* gain power over that ground, and yet it has to take over being the ground in existing.”<sup>72</sup> Heidegger frees transcendentality from the boundaries of the subjectivity of the subject by attributing it to Dasein’s way of Being, that is: to its facticity. It is still the subject that facilitates the constitution, but it is doing so only by existing. Because its transcendentality is part of its factual existence in a world that he or she is always already a part of, this means that every constitution of the intelligibility of the world is a *factual constitution*—a constitution that is neither simply the application of principles nor the intentional acts of the transcendental ego but always already “more” than the subjectivity of the subject.

Heidegger’s position can be described, on the one hand, in terms of his criticism of any attempt to ground Dasein’s transcendentality in itself (which would lead to the “over-empowering of the transcendental subject”) and, on the other hand, by showing that instead, he grounds Dasein’s transcendentality in a trans-subjective manner. The reason for calling this “trans-subjective” is that the subject is only carrying out the constitution, but it is not its ground. The prefix “trans-” therefore indicates something that grounds and yet exceeds the subjectivity of the subject. Heidegger shows this in *Being and Time* when he states:

*Not through* itself, but *released to* itself from the ground in order to be *as the ground*. Dasein is not itself the ground of its being [. . .] but as a self, it is the *being* [Sein] of its ground.<sup>73</sup>

The trans-subjectivity of Dasein is uncovered as the “temporalizing of temporality,” that is, as the “ecstatic-horizonal unity,”<sup>74</sup> in the final paragraphs of *Being and Time*. Heidegger further develops this concept in his lectures on Kant by pointing toward “time” as the mediating center between the subject and the object. There, time’s intrinsic necessary relation to the subject is explained as “self-affection.”<sup>75</sup> Its intrinsic necessary relation to objects on the other hand is explained as the “temporalization” of time.<sup>76</sup> It is time, in other words, that makes it possible that the subject can transcend itself towards transcendent objects—or, if we avoid using the problematic image of the “immanence of subjects” and “transcendent objects”—time makes it possible that Dasein can be in any relation to beings.<sup>77</sup>

For Heidegger, this is the only way to solve the “problem of transcendence”: the only way to ensure that “givenness” means that something is

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

given to us (and not by us) and also that the ontological status of the constituting I is not an unsolvable problem. Heidegger's turn to ontology is a turn-away from the philosophy of subjectivity and the danger of subjectivism. However, it is not a turn away from transcendental philosophy. The transcendental of Dasein is still at the core of Heidegger's philosophy.

In his lecture in the summer of 1928, shortly after the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes this clear when he says that "transcending" is an essential part of Dasein's Being:

1) Transcendence is rather the primordial constitution of the subjectivity of a subject. The subject transcends qua subject; it would not be a subject if it did not transcend. [ . . . ] it is the basic constitution of its Being, on the basis of which Dasein can at all relate to beings in the first place.<sup>78</sup>

He then clarifies the relationship between Dasein's transcendence and its facticity:

Dasein can learn to relate to beings in diverse ways and to confront beings only because Dasein, as existing, is in a world; [ . . . ] Dasein is thrown, factual, thoroughly amidst nature through its bodiliness, and transcendence lies in the fact that these beings, among which Dasein is and to which Dasein belongs, are surpassed by Dasein. In other words, as transcending, Dasein is beyond nature, although, as factual, it remains environed by nature.<sup>79</sup>

It is important to emphasize that Dasein is not transcendence "first" and, in addition, a living being. Facticity belongs to Dasein's constitution.<sup>80</sup> It is not only that Heidegger's approach enables us to account for the givenness of beings within this transcendental and thereby showing a path out of the dangers of subjective idealism. Heidegger's transcendental ontology also allows for non-subjective elements—Dasein's facticity, its sociality, historicity, embodiment, language, and culture—to be part of the constitution of the world. This makes the transcendental investigation of the ontological differences between beings possible—an extension of transcendental philosophy to encompass the richness of the world. Heidegger's approach explains how it is possible to experience beings of all kinds (human beings, animals, nature, etc.) as independent of and genuinely different to the subjectivity of the subject. The genuine alterity of "the other," for example, can only be adequately (critically) thematized through the analysis of how it is constituted within Dasein's trans-subjective factual transcendental.

### *7. The Continuity of Heidegger's Transcendental Ontology*

Heidegger's general criticism of transcendental philosophy post *Being and Time* has led many scholars to believe that the late Heidegger abandons transcendental philosophy altogether—once and for all and in all its possible variations.<sup>81</sup> However, there is enough reason to cast doubt on the absolute nature of these claims. Take, as an example and as supporting evidence, the

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

debate about the “turning” (die *Kehre*) from Heidegger’s early philosophy to his late philosophy.<sup>82</sup> What has been developed in this paper so far allows for an original interpretation of the “turning” that explains it as a necessary consequence of Heidegger’s radicalization of transcendental philosophy and thus demonstrates the continuity of Heidegger’s transcendental ontology.

In Heidegger’s 1928 lecture, Heidegger introduces the term “metontology,” in which he combines the Greek word “metabolé” (commonly translated as “change,” or “transformation”) with the word “ontology,” to highlight that there is a “latent overturning” (*latenter Umschlag*)<sup>83</sup> in ontology—a necessary “turning back” to what ontology presupposes, namely its facticity.<sup>84</sup> This facticity is said to be the precondition for Dasein’s “understanding of Being” to underline its intrinsic relation to Dasein’s transcendentality.<sup>85</sup> The “turning” of Heidegger’s ontology into “metontology” happens when ontology, after laying bare the transcendentality of the subject, is explicitly turning back to the factual “in which it implicitly always remains”<sup>86</sup> and which is its own “point of origin.”<sup>87</sup>

This “turning” of Heidegger’s philosophy is transcendental insofar as said facticity cannot be reflected upon outside of Dasein’s transcendence. “Metontology,” thus, stands for the reflection on the facticity of the constitution *within* the constitution. Metontology is the transcendental ontology of the facticity of its own transcendentality.<sup>88</sup>

Consequently, in “The Essence of Ground” (1929), Heidegger speaks of Dasein’s transcendence as something that *is happening* (and not as something that Dasein is actively, autonomously, or deliberately doing).<sup>89</sup> This shift of emphasis from Dasein’s transcendence to “the happening” of transcendence can be understood as an essential part of the “turning”. At this point, and more so in Heidegger’s talk “The Essence of Truth” (1930), Heidegger turns to the trans-subjective happening of transcendence as a historical event (“*das Ereignis*”)<sup>90</sup> and calls it the “original history”<sup>91</sup> (*Urgeschichte*).

The “turning” or the “metabolé,” that is happening within ontology, is a “turning back” to philosophy’s facticity—to the facticity of the transcendental subject. This facticity is initially uncovered as the historicity of Dasein in *Being and Time* before Heidegger turns to the historicity of the event of Being that lies deeper and grounds even the historicity of Dasein.<sup>92</sup> Heidegger’s transcendental ontology allows for a philosophical understanding of the historicity of the (a priori) principles that determine how we make sense of the world—for example, how Nietzsche’s “will to power” is *pre-determining* how everything in this day and age is experienced.<sup>93</sup>

Further support for my claims can be found in Heidegger’s recently published *On My Own Publications* (2018).<sup>94</sup> Heidegger’s main concern in his four hundred pages of commentary on *Being and Time* is clarifying and making sure that his key term, “projection,” (*Entwurf*), which is equivalent to “constituting,” is not understood in terms of the traditional transcendental

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

philosophy, that is: not in terms of the autonomous and purely subjective constitution of Being but instead as the factual constitution (*geworfener Entwurf*).<sup>95</sup> *Being and Time*, for him, is the attempt to break out of the framework of the philosophy of subjectivity and the paradigm of the dominance of thought.<sup>96</sup>

### 8. Conclusion

I began this paper by talking about the epistemological “problem of transcendence” which is about the question: of how the subject comes out of its immanence and gets to transcendent objects. Heidegger responded that the epistemological problem can only be solved with an ontological account of Dasein’s Being. What Heidegger does, is, shift the emphasis from the paradigm of consciousness and the subject-object dichotomy (“how does the subject constitute objects”) to Dasein’s facticity and the notion of being-in-the-world (“how is the world constituted *within* the subjectivity of the subject”). We could also describe this as turning away from a philosophy that centers around the autonomy of the transcendental subject and its faculties towards a philosophy that has made it its task to reflect on the preconditions of this very subjectivity. Because these preconditions are accessible only through Dasein’s transcendental, Heidegger does not fall back into pre-Critical philosophy. He never claims that his ontology can make assertions about Being independent of Dasein’s relation to it. This is also why *Being and Time* is an analysis of Dasein’s understanding of Being and why even his late philosophy centers around the relationship between the event and Dasein.<sup>97</sup>

The transcendental subject is still at the heart of Heidegger’s philosophy. However, its transcendental is not conceived of as the autonomous application of principles. Rather, it is something that is happening at the core of Dasein’s existence. Dasein’s transcendental is factual which means it is historical, social, finite, embodied, cultural, and discursive. Heidegger’s revised notion of the transcendental subject does not lead to irrationalism. Rather, it is a necessary condition for the encountering of subject and object and the intelligibility of the world.

The main point that most clearly demonstrates the significance of Heidegger’s transcendental ontology is that Heidegger offers a way of thinking about the constitution of the world in which non-subjective aspects can be part of that constitution. Heidegger’s approach allows us to conceptualize this constitution as social and as historical without having to jettison the role of the transcendental subject. In doing so, he not only avoids the aforementioned problems of over-empowering the transcendental subject. He also paves the way for a new kind of thinking that deals with the elucidation of the non-subjective elements of the constitution of the world. He explains how human beings can be in a world that is intelligible and that is always encountered as

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

something that exceeds one's own subjectivity. Only for this reason, beings in this world can potentially have a normative grip on us.

From here, the late Heidegger's shift of emphasis from the transcendental subject to the history of Being is only a small step if we consider what Heidegger said about the facticity of the human being in his late philosophy. In his "Letter about 'Humanism'" Heidegger writes: "The history of Being sustains and determines every condition et situation humaine."<sup>98</sup> Isn't the history of Being also something we find ourselves thrown into and part of how we are? As such, the history of Being must be constitutive of how the human being is transcending. The Being-historical Thinking of the late Heidegger could be made sense of in terms of a reflection on the historicity of the facticity of Dasein's transcendence.<sup>99</sup>

Considering how central the notion of the subject is for modern philosophy, one may expect that Heidegger's approach will involve many methodological implications for an ontological approach to topics like "certainty," "truth," and "knowledge." We have also mentioned some interpretations of Heidegger's philosophy, some of them very influential, whose validity would have to be limited, at least in part. My thoughts about the link between facticity and transcendence should thus be understood as offering a foundation for inquiry into such matters. But our goal here has been merely to establish the conceptual connection between Dasein's facticity and its transcendentality.

*Hunan Huniversity*

### Notes

1. See: Carl Friedrich Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974). See also: Gethmann, „Transzendentalphilosophie – Fundamentalontologie – Anthropologie,“ in: *Kultur – Mensch – Technik* (Leiden, Niederlande: Brill, Fink, 2014).

2. Constituting and transcending are used synonymously to refer to the processes that make up the intelligibility of the world. This is not a creation of the things in the world, but a determination of how these things appear to us. Intelligibility stands for the possibility of any kind of knowledge.

3. See: Heinrich Rickert, *Die Philosophie des Lebens. Darstellung und Kritik der philosophischen Modeströmungen unserer Zeit* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920), 51 and 53. See: Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Tübingen, 1926), 30; See also: Manfred Brelage, *Studien zur Transzendentalphilosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965), 36; Rudolf Zocher, *Die philosophische Grundlehre* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1939); Hans Wagner, *Philosophie und Reflexion* (München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1967), 329. Alexander Schnell, on the other side, has repeatedly defended the thesis that phenomenology is transcendental philosophy. See, for example, Alexander Schnell, *Was ist Phänomenologie?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2019).

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

4. See: Manfred Brelage, *Studien zur Transzendentalphilosophie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965), 124.

5. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, in: *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter cited as GA), vol. 2, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977), 364; translated by Joan Stambaugh as *Being and Time, A Translation of Sein und Zeit* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996). Hereafter cited as BT, followed by the German page number and (only when used) that of Stambaugh's translation. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.

6. Heidegger, BT, 366. See also: Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1989), 217–18. There, too, Heidegger distinguishes between the “fundamental ontological” sense of transcendence in the context of *Being and Time* and an epistemological understanding which is “by-passed in advance” by beginning with an ontological analysis of the human being (ibid.).

7. Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1975), 86–87: “allegedly, the central philosophical problem”; See also: Heidegger, GA 26, 204–8.

8. Heidegger, BT, 364.

9. See: Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, GA 26, ed. by Klaus Held (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1978), 211: “Rather, transcendence is 1. the original make-up of the *subjectivity* of a subject. The subject transcends qua subject, it would not be subject, if it did not transcend. Being a subject means transcending.”

10. Heidegger, BT, 366/335.

11. “Being” with a capitalized B stands for the German word “Sein.” “Seiendes” (singular) translates as “being” and “Seiendes” (plural) as “beings.”

12. Martin Heidegger, GA 62, 364. See also: Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 94 and 164–71. See also: Heidegger, GA 3, §§15–19. Dahlstrom refers to Heidegger's ontological reading of Kant's *Critique* as a provocation for the epistemological reading of the neo-Kantians. See Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger's Kantian Turn: Notes to His Commentary on the ‘Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,’” in: *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Dec. 1991), 329–61, here: 334. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, GA 25, ed. by Ingtraud Görland (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977), 305, where Heidegger says it is necessary to uncover the *ontological* nature of the categories. Another example is Heidegger's discussion of “propositional truth” in terms of the truth of Dasein (its disclosedness) in *Being and Time* (Heidegger, BT, §44).

13. Heidegger, GA 26, 273.

14. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A111, also: A159, B198, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1968).

15. Kant, *KrV*, A51, B75: “These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.”

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

16. Heidegger, GA 65, 315: "Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which since the Greeks once more an essential step is taken [ . . . ]"

17. Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, GA 3, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1991), 59 and 66; see also: *ibid.*, §§15–19. This is not the only "problem" Heidegger sees in Kant's first *Critique*. Dahlstrom lists five dogmas as key points of Heidegger's criticism, see Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Kantian Turn", 344. Nonetheless, as we will argue in the following, it is the main one. Cf. Kant, *KrV*, A55, B79.

18. See: Heidegger, GA 3, 162, where Heidegger calls this a "necessary unity."

19. Kant, *KrV*, A111, A158/B197.

20. See: Heidegger, GA 3, 136: "not just the sum of pure intuition and pure thinking but rather an original unity within which they function only as elements." Cf. Kant, *KrV*, A124.

21. See: Heidegger, GA 25, 334.

22. The difference between Kantians like Allison and Heidegger might be that for the former, the condition of knowledge of objects is an epistemic condition, while Heidegger argues that in order for conditions to be conditions of anything, they must "be" something. They must, in addition, be different to the subjectivity to the subject. See: Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, Revised and Enlarged Edition*, Yale University Press: 2004, 4–19. Heidegger's arguments are presented in the following sections.

23. The term that Heidegger uses in *Being and Time* is "Being-in-the-world" (*In-der-Welt-sein*). Heidegger, BT, 52, *et passim*.

24. In *Contributions*, Heidegger shifts the emphasis from what he calls the "fundamental ontological" understanding of transcendence of *Being and Time* to the phenomenon of the "openness of the sheltering-concealing." See: Heidegger, GA 65, 217–18. Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses the word "clearing" (*Lichtung*), saying that Dasein "is the clearing" within which things can show themselves. The transcendental of the subject (here: Dasein) is bound to its way of being. In *Being and Time*, the main task of ontology is to uncover the (underlying temporality of the) transcendental of the subject. See Heidegger, BT, 133.

25. Chad Engelland, *Heidegger's Shadow. Kant, Husserl, and the Transcendental Turn*, New York: Routledge, 2017, 46.

26. Heidegger, GA 3, 161: "In the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the transcendental imagination as it came to light in the impassioned course of the first edition was forced back and given a new interpretation—in favor of the understanding"; See: Heidegger, GA 3, 66. Heidegger, GA 3, 59. See also the comment (c) on page 162: "With the elimination of the power of imagination, the distinction between sensibility and understanding becomes clearer and sharper. [ . . . ] Now the possibility has also vanished (because of the sharp separation from sensibility (intuition) and thinking), of the necessary unity—to make understandable in general their togetherness and belonging to one another in some way. They lie there like two blocks, [ . . . ]. Even then, the unity of both capacities (the possibility of the unity) must be grasped, or must at least become a problem," transl.

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

(modified) by Richard Taft in: *Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Indiana University Press, 1997, 114. See also: Kant, *KrV*, A79, B105.

27. Kant, *KrV*, §§15–21. Here: B132–33.

28. Heidegger, GA 3, 66 and 72–76. See also: Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 39–41.

29. The term “philosophy of subjectivity” is used to refer to every kind of philosophy that relies on the subject for answering questions about validity, truth, and certainty. Its paradigm is the Cartesian philosophy and its basic concept is that of self-consciousness. See: Marina Bykova, “The Philosophy of Subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel.” In: *The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy* 2007, 10: 147–53. See also: Martin Heidegger, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” in: *Holzwege*, GA 5, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt a.M: Klostermann, 1977, 75–114. In Heidegger’s Kant lecture of 1935/36, Kant’s philosophy is much more strongly placed in a historical framework in which his philosophy represents a certain paradigm, namely that of a dominance of thought. I refer to this as the philosophy of subjectivity. See: Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, GA 41, ed. By Petra Jaeger, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984.

30. Heidegger, GA 3, 120 and 196–97. Cf. Heidegger, GA 26, 272. See also Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Kantian Turn,” 335–38.

31. Heidegger, GA 3, 138.

32. Heidegger, GA 3, 90. According to Heidegger, the schematism-chapter (and not the transcendental deduction) is the “centerpiece” of the first *Critique* (ibid., 89) because it reveals the inner timely character of both the categories and sensibility. See also, ibid., 137.

33. Dahlstrom explains Heidegger’s argument about how self-affection and time necessarily belong together in: Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Kantian Turn,” 338.

34. A problem that is more prevalent in neo-Kantianism than it is in Kant’s philosophy. It is worth noting that Heidegger’s criticism of Kant is directed more at the epistemological reading of Kant by the neo-Kantians than it is an actual criticism of Kant. See: Heidegger, GA 3, 73–76. See Heidegger, GA 25, 309: “to protect Kant from Kantians.” See Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Kantian Turn,” 329–61, for an account of Heidegger’s “anti-neo-Kantian” reading of Kant.

35. Chad Engelland, *Heidegger’s Shadow. Kant, Husserl, and the Transcendental Turn*, New York: Routledge 2017, 151. For Heidegger, this is the case when Kant, in the B-edition of his first *Critique*, “shrinks back” from understanding time as the ground of the subject-object relation and instead reinforces the paradigm of the dominance of thought. See: Heidegger, GA 3, 155–82, 189–90 (here: 214).

36. Engelland, *Heidegger’s Shadow*, 151.

37. See: Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1964.

38. See: Sebastian Luft, *Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, 2011. Luft calls this the “correlational a priori” and explains it as a noetic-noematic structure that is the link between transcendental subjectivity and the lifeworld (here: 14). Klaus Held, referring to Husserl’s *Crisis*, calls it the “universal correlational a priori,” which is the “operational basis of any phenomenology.” Klaus

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

Held, "Heidegger and the Principle of Phenomenology", in: *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, Christopher Macann (ed.), vol. II., Routledge: 1992, 307.

39. See: Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, GA 20, ed. by Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), 148–57. Heidegger says what is missing is an ontological analysis of consciousness which could explain its essential referentiality to objects (something that makes "intentionality" possible).

40. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, HUA Bd. 1, S. Strasser (ed.), Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950, §§18–19.

41. Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 48–52. See: Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§18–19.

42. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, 79.

43. Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 49–50.

44. See: Heidegger, GA 20, 157–59.

45. See: Heidegger, GA 24, 247. Cf. Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 48–49.

46. Steven Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology*, 263.

47. In the context of Heidegger's Kant-interpretation this was called the "*quaestio facti*" which is an ontological interpretation of the subject's transcendental. In regard to Husserl, this could be reformulated as the question about the possibility of the a priori correlation between the transcendental ego and its lifeworld. Heidegger criticizes Husserl for neither asking the question about the Being of consciousness, nor about the Being of the intentional states. See: Heidegger, GA 20, §12.

48. Heidegger mentions the term "subjective idealism" once in one of his Kant-lectures—still insisting that Kant's reliance on sensibility prevents him from falling into the trap of this -ism. However, he points out that the danger of "subjective idealism" becomes more apparent, the more pure understanding gains the upper hand. See: Heidegger, GA 3, 73. See also: Heidegger, GA 20, 145. Even in Heidegger's lecture on Kant in 1935/36, he criticizes the unquestioned priority of the subject that is reflected by Kant's appeal to principles of pure understanding for the determination of entities. See: Heidegger, GA 3, 73. See also: Chad Engelland, *Heidegger's Shadow*, 149.

49. See: Heidegger, GA 3, 75. In this regard, there is a similarity between Heidegger's and Hegel's criticism of Kant. See in particular: G.W.F. Hegel, *Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie*, in: *Werke in 20 Bänden*, Band 2 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970).

50. See: Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 41.

51. Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 50.

52. See: Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 41 and 49. See also: Heidegger, GA 25, 334.

53. See: Heidegger, GA 20, 145.

54. See: Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 49–50.

55. See: Heidegger, GA 7, 73.

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

56. For a similar criticism of this problem in Husserl's (transcendental) phenomenology, see Roman Ingarden's comments on Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* in: Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Husserliana vol. I, ed. by S. Strasser, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1973, 205–11.

57. Heidegger in a letter to Husserl 22. Oct. 1927, in: Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Husserliana vol. IX, ed. by W. Biemel, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1962, 602. Heidegger's term "way of Being" (*Seinsart*) refers to the human being's unique way of being in the world. It is different from, for example, the way of being of a rock or of a plant. Heidegger asks the same questions in his criticism of Kant, see for example: Heidegger, GA 9, 450 and 474.

58. See: Kant, KrV, B404.

59. See: Heidegger, GA 21, 60–90.

60. Kant-scholars could argue that Heidegger misunderstood Kant's concept of the principle of apperception by identifying it with the subjective and autonomous application of categories. They could demonstrate that the principle of apperception is the non-subjective (normative) precondition for the objectivity of objects. Beiser, for example, describes the apperception as "extramental" and "extraphysical" to counter the "subjectivist reading" of Kant's first *Critique*. See: Frederick C Beiser, *German Idealism*, Harvard University Press: 2008, 137–38. Schulting calls Kant's approach "radical" or "critical subjectivism" to distinguish it from the "bad subjectivism" that is read into Kant's *Critique*. See: Dennis Schulting, *Kant's Radical Subjectivism*, Palgrave, Macmillan 2017, 16–22. See also the "metaepistemological" (rather than ontological) interpretation of Allison, in: Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, Revised and Enlarged Edition*, Yale University Press: 2004, 4–19. Husserl-scholars could demonstrate that the givenness of the given within intentional acts is not a product in the sense of something that the subject produces. It is something that "takes place" within intentionality. "Givenness," for Husserl, is a non-subjective, non-psychological, feature of intentional acts. That objects are present as themselves within intentional acts does not imply that this presence is merely subjective ("produced"). See, for example: Louis Dupre, "The Concept of Truth in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*," in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Mar. 1964), 345–54, in particular: 351–52. They could also point towards Husserl's different approaches to the problem of the self-constitution of time-consciousness and claim that only focusing on Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* does not do justice to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

61. Heidegger in a letter to Husserl 22. Oct. 1927, in: Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925* (Hua IX), ed. by W. Biemel, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1962, 602.

62. See: Heidegger, GA 20, §§11–12.

63. See: Heidegger, BT, §§2–5: "The Ontological Analytic of Dasein as Laying Bare the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Meaning of Being in General." For Heidegger, this transcendentalism is not identified with the Cartesian *percipere*, nor with reason in the Kantian sense. Rather, for Heidegger, Dasein's transcendence is that of understanding (*Verstehen*), findingness (*Befindlichkeit*), and discourse (*Rede*). See: Heidegger, BT, §§29–34. See also: Heidegger, GA 82, 154.

64. Heidegger, BT, 372 (transl. by Joan Stambaugh [slightly modified]).

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

65. See: Martin Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, vol. 27, Otto Saame, Ina Saame-Speidel (eds.) (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996), 213–16: “Explicitly transcending, however, is as the question about Being as such the same as philosophizing” (here: 214). See also: “Explicitly transcending as philosophizing is the self-repeating question about the Being of beings” (here: 216).

66. See: Heidegger, BT, 285.

67. See: Heidegger, GA 26, 110: “We ourselves are the source of the idea of Being, but this source is to be understood as the primal transcendence of Dasein. This is what is meant by drawing the idea of Being from the ‘subject.’ An understanding of Being belongs to the subject only insofar as the subject is something that transcends. Various articulations of Being arise, then, from transcendence.” (transl. by Michael Heim. *Martin Heidegger: The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1984). See also: Heidegger, GA 62, 364: Heidegger calls this the “ontology of facticity.”

68. See: Heidegger, BT, 6, 15–17, 130.

69. Kant discusses two forms of pre-Critical philosophy, the rationalism or intellectualism of Leibniz and the empiricism or materialism of Locke in the “Amphiboly” chapter of the first *Critique*. See: Kant, KrV, A266/B322. Also, see his discussion of Plato and Epicurus at the end of the *Critique*, in the “History of Pure Reason,” *ibid.*, A854/B883. A more common distinction is that between idealism and realism. However, Heidegger’s transcendental ontology cannot be described as either of them. For a further discussion of these terms, see: Bruno, G. Anthony “Varieties of Transcendental Idealism: Kant and Heidegger Thinking Beyond Life,” in: *Idealistic Studies* 45 (1): 2015, 81–102.

70. For an overview of this development, see: Herman Philipse, “Overcoming Epistemology,” in: *The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy*, ed. by Michael Rosen and Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234097.003.0011.

71. See: Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 51. See also: Heidegger, BT, §58.

72. Heidegger, BT, 284.

73. Heidegger, BT, 284–85.

74. Heidegger, BT, 360. See, *ibid.*, §69.

75. See: Heidegger, GA 25, 395. See also: Heidegger, GA 3, 188. And: Heidegger, GA 21, 338–46.

76. See: Heidegger, BT, 365.

77. For Heidegger’s understanding of the relation between time and Being, see: Heidegger GA 82, 247–48. See also: Karl Kraatz, “A New Look at *Being and Time*: Martin Heidegger’s Self-Criticism in *On My Own Publications*,” in: *The Review of Metaphysics*, 75, March 2022, Vol. 75, No. 3, Issue No. 299, pp. 501–24.

78. Heidegger, GA 26, 211 (transl. by Michael Heim). See also: Heidegger, GA 9, 138: “*being* a subject means: to be a being as and in transcendence.”

79. Heidegger, GA 26, 212 (transl. by Michael Heim). See also: Heidegger, GA 9, 166.

## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

80. See: Heidegger, BT, 285.

81. See: Heidegger, GA 82, 382. See for example: Eric S. Nelson: "Heidegger's Failure to Overcome Transcendental Philosophy," in: Halla Kim & Steven Hoeltzel (eds.), *Transcendental Inquiry* (Palgrave, 2016), 159–79. And also: Richard Capobianco: "The 'Turn' Away from the Transcendental-Phenomenological Positioning of *Being and Time* to the Thinking of Being as *Physis* and *Aletheia*," in: Alfred Denker, Holger Zaborowski (eds.), *Heidegger Jahrbuch* 11, (Klett-Cotta, 2017), 89–99. Gethmann also criticizes Heidegger for his one-sided rejection of his own transcendental philosophy. See: Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung*, 320–34.

82. See: Orlando Pugliese, *Vermittlung und Kehre, Grundzüge des Geschichtsdenkens bei Martin Heidegger*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Freiburg, München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1965). The turning as an immanent transformation of Heidegger's philosophy is a reoccurring topic in the works of Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Heideggers "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie"* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991). Id., *Wahrheit, Freiheit, Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002). Id., *Transzendenz und Ereignis. Heideggers „Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)“ Ein Kommentar* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2019).

83. Heidegger, GA 26, 201.

84. Heidegger, GA 26, 199: "The intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of origin [. . .]. [. . .] being is there only when Dasein understands being. In other words, the possibility that being is there in the understanding presupposes the factual existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of nature."

85. Heidegger, GA 26, 200: "Metontology is possible only on the basis and in the perspective of the radical ontological problematic and is possible conjointly with it. Precisely the radicalization of fundamental ontology brings about the above-mentioned overturning of ontology out of its very self."

86. Heidegger, GA 26, 201.

87. Heidegger, GA 26, 199. In *Being and Time*, this is called the necessary "repetition" (*Wiederholung*) of the interpretation on the basis of the findings of the previous analysis. In this lecture, Heidegger mentions that the first step was the analysis of Dasein, the second step was the analysis of the temporality of Being; then adds that the third step is what he now calls the "turning" of ontology into metontology.

88. Heidegger refers to the same idea in his lecture of 1928/29 when he identifies philosophy with an explicit way of transcending. See: Heidegger, GA 27, 216.

89. See: Martin Heidegger, „Vom Wesen des Grundes,“ in: *Wegmarken*, GA 9, ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1976), 159.

90. See: Heidegger, „Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,“ in: *Wegmarken*, GA 9, 193.

91. Heidegger, GA 9, 159.

92. See: Heidegger, BT, §§72–75. See: Martin Heidegger, GA 65, 227. Cf. Heidegger, GA 9, 314.

93. For Heidegger's famous remarks on the technological "enframing" of modern times, see: Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," GA 7, 5–36.

## MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTAL ONTOLOGY

94. Heidegger, *On My Own Publications*, GA 82, Friedrich Wilhelm v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2018).
95. See for example: Heidegger, GA 82, 158, 251, 274, 327.
96. See: Heidegger, GA 82, 162, 164 and 386.
97. See: Martin Heidegger, GA 65, 293–27: „Da-sein und Seyn.“
98. Heidegger, GA 9, 314.
99. See: Karl Kraatz, *Die Methodologie der Philosophie Martin Heideggers. Über die Grenzen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und die Möglichkeiten der Philosophie* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2020).

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## IDEALISTIC STUDIES

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